The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Author:Caroline Kennedy-Pipe [Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: History, General, Political Science
ISBN: 9781317894582
Google: BtcFBAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-07-15T20:45:29+00:00

In Cyprus the British had had experience of dealing with insurgents who had operated in a similar fashion. For example, George Grivas, leader of the EOKA [Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agonistan] which was dedicated to removing the British presence in Cyprus, had used his troops in two groupings: one operated in the countryside, creating rural incidents to distract the British Army away from the other group operating in the cities.79 The PIRA followed the same strategy successfully and in 1973 the decision was made to withdraw British troops from the border. The primary explanation for this change was that the escalation of violence in the cities following internment called for increased troop levels, but the Army also felt vulnerable on the border and the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank King, felt that the military was dissipating too many of its resources in an area where it would always be labouring under disadvantages.80 During 1973, the British Army made the cities, in particular Belfast, the centre of its operations.

Yet by 1975, the military importance of the border area had grown significantly. The British Army had to an extent been successful in the cities as a result of the intense concentration on an urban strategy.81 Given the decision by the British Government to allow the RUC the lead in policing the cities in 1975 — the strategy of ‘Ulsterization’ — the Army would be freed up to go back to the border. This had become necessary because during the mid-1970s the PIRA appeared to be concentrating on a rural campaign. In particular, British strategists were worried by the activities of the terrorists in the area of the border known as ‘murder triangle’ or ‘bandit country’. Since the cease-fire of Christmas 1974, the PIRA had killed twenty-six people in the area and was able to mount road blocks at will. Of the twelve soldiers killed in Northern Ireland that year, nine had been killed in South Armagh.82 Sectarian violence had also spiralled quite dramatically; it seemed as if competing groups of Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries were operating in the border areas. Two particularly vicious incidents of sectarian violence made it imperative that the British Army was seen to be acting against the paramilitaries. In July 1975 the Ulster Volunteer Force hijacked the Miami Show Band as they were returning to the Republic after an engagement in the North and all four Catholic members of the band were killed. In retaliation, a group of eleven Protestant workers were hijacked as they returned home from work and murdered by a group claiming to be the South Armagh Republican Action Group.83 This group had never been heard of before, but was generally regarded to be a splinter group of the PIRA.84 At this stage the British Army simply did not have sufficient numbers of troops to contend with the activities of PIRA, or indeed the other paramilitary groups, along the border. Large rural towns are quite easily garrisoned but the small rural hamlets are impossible to watch all the time.

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